Abstract:
Side-channel analysis have been introduced in the late nineties by Kocher et al. [1] to recover the secret keys of cryptographic implementations by exploiting the information leaked over side-channels. For embedded cryptographic devices typical side-channels are represented by the power consumption or by the electro-magnetic (EM) field emanations of physical implementations when executing cryptographic algorithms. Over the last two decades a lot of side-channel attacks have been developed and a variety of countermeasures have been proposed in literature to thwart side-channel analysis. Nevertheless, the quest after improved attacks and countermeasures is still a very active area of research, as testified by the many conferences and recent developments. In this talk, we provide an introduction to side-channel attacks covering some main topics like measurement setup, leakage models and statistical analysis. Then, we provide an overview on typical countermeasures against side-channel attacks covering different level of abstractions (circuit, algorithmic and protocol level).

[1] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun. Differential Power Analysis. In M.J. Wiener, editor, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO ?99, volume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 388-397. Springer, 1999.

CVs:
Hermann Seuschek studied electrical engineering and information technology at Technische Universität München. Afterwards he worked for the central research and development department within the Siemens AG on topics related to applied cryptography and security for embedded systems. He left Siemens and joined the Institute for Security in Information Technology at Technische Universität München to pursue research in the field of automated side channel hardening of cryptographic algorithms.

Fabrizio De Santis studied computer engineering at Politecnico di Milano and completed his thesis at Advanced System Technology (AST) Laboratories (R&D) of STMicroelectronics. In 2011 he joined the Institute for Security in Information
Technology at Technische Universität München. In the period 2011 – 2013 he worked on the development of secure cryptographic implementations at Infineon Technologies AG in München.